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SHAREHOLDER ENFORCED
MARKET DISCIPLINE:
HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH?

ERIC J. GOUVIN*

I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the widespread bank failures of the 1980s and early
1990s, the federal banking regulators developed an arsenal of regulatory
weapons designed to impose the cost of bank failure on bank holding
companies. Although many justifications for this regulatory strategy have
been offered, it appears motivated at least in part by the hope that the threat
of potentially massive liability will prompt bank holding companies to more
actively monitor bank managers, thereby reducing risky bank activities and
saving losses to the deposit insurance fund. While this regulatory dynamic
holds much intuitive appeal, it is misguided. It is another example of
regulators "fighting the last war."
Although excessively risky bank activity may have been a significant
cause of the banking crisis recently past, and although the regulatory
weapons may have the effect of discouraging banks from taking risks, the
current regulatory arsenal amounts to overkill in light of other changes in the
law. Specifically, the development of risk-based capital requirements has
already effectively eradicated the risky activity problem that the holding
company liability provisions are designed to reach. In the end, the excessive
potential liability for bank holding companies creates excessive caution on
the part of bank managers and puts the banking industry at a disadvantage
relative to its competitors in the fmancial services industry. The conse

*©1996 Eric J. Gouvin, Professor of Law, Western New England College School of
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311

312

ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW

[Vol. 16:311

quences of over regulation can be devastating, especially when the excessive
regulations themselves are unlikely to achieve their purported goal. 1
The first part of this article examines the moral hazard problem created
by the presence of the deposit insurance scheme in the banking industry and
the market discipline debate that has attempted to correCt the moral hazard
problem.2 If the reader is willing to accept my view that the law has evolved
to make bank shareholders, i.e., bank holding companies, the primary
enforcers of market discipline, this section may be passed over. The article's
·second section examines the specific regulatory changes that have been
designed to create an incentive for bank holding companies to impose
discipline on bank management? Again, readers who are willing to believe
that the source of strength doctrine, regulatory agreements, capital restoration
plans, the elaboration of a general fiduciary duty to regulators, equitable
subordination, cross-guarantee provisions, preferences, and fraudulent
conveyances all are part of a strategy to make bank holding companies more
responsible for bank failure may skip this section and proceed directly to the
third section. That section argues that the regulatory attempts at making
shareholders the enforcers of market discipline are misguided because they
will not achieve their intended effect.4 Instead, the banking industry will be
saddled with excessive regulations that will place it at a competitive
disadvantage relative to the other players in the financial services industry.

II. THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM
Over the past ten years legal scholars have written a great deal about the
moral hazard problem created by the existence of deposit insurance, and have
suggested ways to correct it. 5 In general, a moral hazard problem results

1

See infra notes 153-184 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 5-89 and accompanying text.
3
See infra notes 90-152 and accompanying text.
4
See infra notes 153-184 and accompanying text.
5
See, e.g., Douglas D. Evanoff, Preferred Sources of Market Discipline, 10 YALE J.
ON REG. 347 (1993) (suggesting changes in the capital structure of banks and use of
subordinated debt holders as the major source of market discipline); Helen A. Garten,
Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. ON
REG. 129 (1986) (arguing that greater reliance on market discipline to reduce bank risk
is likely to prove counterproductive); Helen A. Garten, Market Discipline Revisited, 14
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 187 (1995) [hereinafter Garten, Revisited] (suggesting that no
single source of market discipline has emerged as an ideal check on bank performance);
2
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whenever one actor or class of actors in a transaction can undertake risky
behavior without fear of loss because the loss from the risky activity falls on
a different actor or group of actors by contract or other arrangement.6 By
avoiding the consequences of their risky behavior, the actors undertaking that
behavior essentially transfer wealth to themselves from the actors who
ultimately bear the risk of loss. 7 One glaring moral hazard in the banking
industry is the lack of incentive for an FDIC-insured bank to avoid excessive
risks because bank management knows that any losses from excessive risk-

Helen A. Garten, Still Banking on the Market: A Comment on the Failure of Market
Discipline, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 241 (1988) (commenting on Macey & Garrett's article,
infra, and reassessing the limited role of market discipline in controlling bank risk);
Helen A. Garten, What Price Bank Failure?, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1159 (1989) (concluding
that current bank failure policy is more efficient and far less disruptive than alternatives
in facilitating the rapid reallocation of banking resources following bank failure);
Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary
of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215 (1988) (arguing
that, for depositor discipline to be effective, depositors' assets must be exposed to some
risk); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the
Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1153 (1988) (suggesting changes in the
regulatory scheme governing the behavior of banks to increase the efficiency of two
principal sources of constraints on management activities); Manuel A. Utset, The
Discipline of Institutions and the Disciplining of Banks, 14 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 211
(1995) (exploring how the institutional structure of banks makes it difficult to discipline
them).
6
See RICHARD POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 150 (3d ed. 1986). Moral
hazards are not unique to the banking industry, but rather are a common feature of
transactions in which an actor may be shielded from liability by insurance or by limited
liability business forms. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and
the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 103-04 (1985). Of course, all corporations
entail some moral risk because the limited liability form always presents the opportunity
to shift losses from the equity holders to creditors and other claimants. See id. In banking
the problem is aggravated by the presence of deposit insurance; correcting the deposit
insurance aspect of the moral hazard problem will not completely eliminate the moral
hazard problem.
7
See Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation ofBanks and Bank Holding Companies,
73 VA. L. REV. 301, 314 (1987).
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taking will fall on the deposit insurance fund and not on the parties taking
the risk, or on the bank's equity holders.8
The most common moral risk scenario, and the one that plagued the
banking system during the b3nking crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s,
occurs when an insured bank is nearly insolvent. 9 When facing zero net
worth, a bank's managers and equity holders have little to lose and much to
gain by causing the bank to make higher-yielding, but riskier, loans and
investments. To attract deposits to fund those risky activities, the bank has
to raise its deposit interest rates above the market rate. 10 Because the
troubled bank can offer insured deposits to the public, depositors may be
willing to deposit funds in a bank at a high rate of interest, even when they
are generally aware of the bank's poor financial condition. 11 In this classic
scenario, the risk of loss from the bank's risky activities falls not on the
equity holders, the bank's management, or the depositors, 12 but on the
deposit insurance fund.
The existence and workings of the moral hazard problem have been
well-understood for a long time, and several approaches to correcting the
problem have been suggested. Of course, one. way to eliminate banking's
special moral hazard problem would be to eliminate deposit insurance. 13

8
See JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULA
TION 266 (1992); see also William A. Lovett, Moral Hazard, Bank Supervision and Risk
Based Capital Requirements, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1365, 1365-77 (1989) (emphasizing
government's obligation to prevent bank failures).
~at is, when its net worth is near or approaching zero.
10
See NICHOLAS A. LASH, BANKING LAWS AND REGULATIONS: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 105-06 (1987).
11
See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1199-1202. At least this is how the classic
c;:onception of the problem worked. Legislative changes made in the late eighties and
early nineties have changed the dynamics of the problem significantly. See infra notes
17-24 and accompanying text.
12
See infra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
13
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Deposit Insurance, the Implicit

Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks' Assets and
Liabilities, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 14-15 (1995). Although the conventional wisdom
holds that banks must have deposit insurance in order to attract any deposits, and some
states even require banks doing business within -their borders to have deposit insurance,
see, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 422(1) (West 1964), at least one bank has
considered that the regulatory costs of having deposit insurance coverage outweigh the
benefits. See Bill Atkinson, Oklahoma Banker Drops FDIC Coverage, BANKING WK.,
Oct. 4, 1993, at 1 (discussing an Oklahoma bank which, after dropping the FDIC as its
insurer, planned to use the savings to pay higher interest rates to customers).
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Complete elimination of deposit insurance, however, seems to be an extreme
reaction to the problem. Although Macey and Miller have argued that the
deposit insurance scheme is nothing but a rent-seeking payoff to bankers, 14
most banking commentators see deposit insurance as more than a mere
wealth transfer. 15 The deposit insurance system promotes stability in the
banking system by preventing old-fashioned bank runs that cause banks to
fail from liquidity crises rather than poor management. By eliminating the
incentive for depositors to pull their funds out of an insured bank during
times of panic, deposit insurance lends stability to the banking system. At the
same time, however, it takes away an important feedback loop for bank
management. 16 Before the advent of deposit insurance, the fear of a public
perception of financial weakness that could trigger a run acted as a check on
bankers' behavior. Deposit insurance removed that important check by
eliminating depositors' fears of losing their deposits and thereby paved the
way for more risk-taking by bankers, ultimately culminating in the moral
hazard problem.
In the wake of the massive bank failures of the 1980s, academics and
regulators began to consider ways to ameliorate the moral hazard problem
using techniques less drastic than complete elimination of deposit insurance.
Two general strategies emerged: ( 1) disrupt the classic moral hazard scenario
so that large amounts of insured funds could not flow into troubled banks;
and (2) create incentives for constituencies interested in the bank to take an
active role in monitoring, and moderating, the bank's risk-taking. The law
has changed to implement both of these strategies.

holds that banks must have deposit insurance in order to attract any deposits, and some
states even require banks doing business within their borders to have deposit insurance,
see, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 422(1) (West 1964), at least one bank has
considered that the regulatory costs of having deposit insurance coverage outweigh the
benefits. See Bill Atkinson, Oklahoma Banker Drops FDIC Coverage, BANKING WK.,
Oct. 4, 1993, at 1 (discussing an Oklahoma bank which, after dropping the FDIC as its
insurer, planned to use the savings to pay higher interest rates to customers).
14
Historically, deposit insurance provided an economic payoff to bankers by allowing
them to pay below-market rates for their funds. See Macey & Miller, supra note 13, at
17-23.
15
See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, THE CHANGING
BUSINESS OF BANKING: A STUDY OF FAILED BANKS FROM 1987 TO 1992, at 3 (1994)
[hereinafter CBO STUDY] (surveying the historical background of deposit insurance);
John L. Douglas, Deposit Insurance Reform, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 11, 14-16 (1992)
(same).
16
See CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 3.
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attracting high-priced deposits to fund high-risk activities. 17 No longer may
banks which are "not well capitalized" accept funds from deposit brokers. 18
Banks that do use deposit brokers may not pay deposit interest rates that
significantly exceed local market rates. 19 Banks which are undercapitalized
may not pay deposit interest rates that significantly exceed local market rates
regardless of the means by which they solicit those deposits.Z0
In addition to these prohibitions, the federal banking regulators have
been given the authority to use early regulatory intervention to prevent weak
banks from deteriorating into large financial disasters. Short of actually
closing a troubled bank, the federal bank regulators are empowered to order
"prompt corrective action" when banks become undercapitalized. 21 At a
mmtmum, banks deemed to be undercapitalized22 must submit capital
restoration plans.23 Regulators also have the power to wind up troubled

17
These changes were contained in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 ("FDICIA"), Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
·
18
See 12 U.S.C. § 183lf(a) (1994). Deposit brokers employ sophisticated methods to
place large deposits in the highest yielding deposit accounts on a nationwide basis. The
deposits are placed with FDIC-insured institutions in amounts close to or equalling the
maximum deposit insurance amount so that the owners of the deposit funds may chase
the highest yields without fear of losing the deposit itself if the bank fails. See id.
§ 1831f(g)(3).
19
See id. § 1831f(e).'
20
See id. § 183lf(h).
21
See id. 1831o.
22
The law classifies banks into five categories: "well capitalized," "adequately
capitalized," "undercapitalized," "significantly undercapitalized," and "critically under
capitalized." Id. § 1831o(b)(1).
23
See id. § 1831o(e)(2). Significantly undercapiialized institutions are subject to
further restrictions, such as the requirement that they recapitalize, limitations on transac
tions with affiliates, restrictions on interest rates, asset growth and activities, changes or
improvements in management, and other actions specified in the statute, including the
catch-all authority to take "any action that the agency determines will better carry out the
purpose of this section." /d. § 1831o(t). In addition, critically undercapitalized banks face
even more restrictions, such as the suspension of payments of interest and principal on
subordinated debt, and the requirement of FDIC approval before making certain transac
tions, such as entering into any transaction other than in the ordinary course of business,
extending credit for a leveraged buyout, making material changes in accounting proce
dures or paying excessive compensation or bonuses to management. See id.
§ 1831o(h)(i). ·
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institutions while they can still pay off their depositors, thereby preserving
the deposit insurance fund. 24
·
These regulatory and statutory changes have had the overall effect of
disrupting the classic moral hazard scenario that plagued the deposit
insurance system in the past decade. Although banks may still engage in
risky activities that do not rely on highly volatile brokered deposits for
funding, traditional regulatory oversight should keep those activities in check.
Yet despite their success in eliminating the most troublesome moral hazard,
the regulators have gone even farther and also implemented strategies
designed to encourage non-regulators to engage in monitoring bank
management.

B. Imposing Market Discipline
To further address the moral hazard problem, the banking regulators
have devised ways to impose "market discipline" on banks. The goal of the
market discipline strategy is to heighten the incentives for stakeholders in the
banking enterprise to keep tabs on the level of risk being assumed by bank
management. The universe of potential stakeholders appropriate for imposing
greater discipline on banks includes: 25 (1) depositors; (2) other creditors
(such as subordinated debtholders); (3) the market for corporate control; (4)
management; (5) private third-party insurers; (6) the government; and (7)
shareholders.26 As the market discipline debate developed, two groups,

24

See id. § 1823 note (Early Resolution of Troubled Insured Depository Institutions).
There are, of course, practical problems that early intervention brings to the fore. For
instance, it is often difficult to accurately assess the value of a troubled bank's assets at
all relevant times, and in addition, liquidating a bank at an inopportune time could effec
tively wipe out any going concern value that the institution possessed. Finally, there may
be constitutional questions entwined in the decision to close a bank before it is actually
insolvent. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947) (raising separation of
powers and due process concerns).
·
25
This list is an expansion of one found in Garten, Revisited, supra note 5, at 193.
Professor Garten's excellent article provides a tidy analysis of market discipline, but does
not include management or outside third parties as potential sources of market discipline.
26
0ne would think that having such a large number of potential monitors would be·
the best of all possible worlds for insuring that bank managers pay attention to the level
of risk-taking, but having too many monitors raises its own set of problems, such as the
potential for inaction caused by all of the monitors trying to free ride on the others with
the result that no potential monitor actually performs the monitoring role. See Utset,
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subordinated debtholders and depositors, emerged as seemingly the most
appropriate actors to enforce market discipline on bank managers. Despite
the intuitive appeal of using creditors as risk-monitors however, the
following discussion shows that creditors, and most other potential monitors,
are not well suited for the role. As policy has evolved in banking regulation,
the burden of enforcing market discipline has fallen increasingly on the
shoulders of the equity holders.
1.

Depositors

One way to keep bank managers attuned to the level of risk they are
undertaking is to encourage the highly liquid, short-term creditors of the
bank-its depositors-to withdraw their funds when they sense that the
bank's activities render it too risky. Although the fear of a bank run could
act as an effective check on reckless management behavior, under our current
deposit insurance scheme depositors have no incentive to cause a bank run.
Indeed, deposit insurance was developed primarily to create a disincentive
for depositors to withdraw their funds in the event of perceived bank
instability ?7 While the deposit insurance program has increased the stability
of the banking system, it has taken away the in terrorem effect of bank runs
and shifted the burden of monitoring bank riskiness to the government
regulators who administer the insurance fund. 28 Of course, the present
deposit insurance scheme could be modified to give depositors some stake
in the quality of bank management. In reality, however, attempts to make
depositors more interested in banking only with solid firms, such as by

supra note 5, at 219-21 (explaining that the greater the number of potential monitors,
the greater the free-rider problem).
21
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, America's Banking System: The
Origins and Future of the Current Crisis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 769, 803-04 (1991)
(explaining that in a world without deposit insurance, banks would have to design
contractual solutions to the collective action problem).

28
See generally CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 3 ("Deposit insurance was supposed
to immunize the system as a whole against a contagious response to individual bank
failures, but in so doing it transferred the burden of monitoring individual institutions
from the creditors of depositories to regulators.").
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lowering insurance coverage29 or providing for co-insurance or deductibles,
are too politically infeasible to merit serious discussion?0
Even if an occasional bank run might be a good idea, the typical bank
depositor likely lacks the sophistication or information to act in the
monitoring role. 31 Depositors may be prone to act on rumors or even to
misconstrue events and cause runs on banks that should not fail. Given these
obstacles, charging depositors with the important task of monitoring bank
management does not make much sense.
Perhaps focusing on the typical (small) depositor is inappropriate. The
largest, and therefore uninsured, depositors might serve as effective risk
monitors if the task were left to them. Yet even depositors who possess the
sophistication to process information about banks might not have complete
access to the information they need to make a complete assessment of the
financial condition of the bank. 32 Even assuming the information is accessi
ble, it remains to be seen whether one or more depositors can interpret the
information properly and communicate a correct conclusion to the depositor
class. The logistics of such a task are formidable.
To help depositors cope with the overwhelming amount of information
needed to assess bank health, several companies have taken on the task of
rating the riskiness of banks and providing bank customers with a report, for
a fee. 33 Using this information, some sophisticated depositors may be able

2

'Tiespite the significant changes made to deposit insurance in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, Congress made no attempt to lower the $100,000 insurance limit, to prevent
depositors from increasing coverage through the use of different accounts held in
different capacities, or to limit the aggregate per depositor at all institutions. See Richard
S. Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC Improvement Act of
1991, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 317, 368--69 (1993).
30
See Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding
Companies, 107 HARV. L. REv. 507, 591 (1994) (noting the serious political resistance
that a scheme to increase depositor liability would encounter).
31
See R. Mark Williamson, Regulatory Theory and Deposit Insurance Reform, 42
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 105, 114-17 (1994).
32
While bank examination reports are confidential, securities filings for publicly
traded banks and call reports for all banks are public knowledge. See Alfred D.
Mathewson, From Confidential Supervision to Market Discipline: The Role ofDisclosure
in the Regulation of Commercial Banks, 11 J. CORP. L. 139, 141 (1986).
33
Richard H. Gamble, Will Your Banks Clear The Bar? Measures of Financial
Strength, CORP. CASHFLOW, Nov. 1992, at S18-22 (discussing how to assess important
bank financial data to discover banks' weaknesses and providing information on vendors
of bank data that perform analysis for a fee).
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to operate as market disciplinarians. Indeed, the law has taken some limited
steps to force depositors to step into the monitor's role, especially by
apparently repealing the "too big to fail" doctrine? 4 By explicitly restricting
the FDIC's ability to provide insurance coverage to depositors with funds at
risk over the insurance limits, Congress is telling these large depositors to do
their homework to make sure the banks they deal with are strong enough not
to fail.
In a dynamic system where large depositors monitor bank health on an
ongoing basis, changes in the bank's relative health should result in the
depositors withdrawing their funds when they judge themselves insecure. The
withdrawal of large institutional accounts could cause the bank to fail. 35 It
is unclear, however, how such a precipitous failure would help conserve the
deposit insurance fund. Once the large depositors flee, the bank's failure is
guaranteed. The FDIC will still have to make good all of the insured deposits
in the institution. The only beneficial effect of this form of discipline is to
convince bank management along the way that it must be conservative
enough not to lose its big institutional accounts. Whether this connection is
strong enough to have any real effect on management behavior is certainly
a matter for debate. 36 Many factors in addition to bank riskiness influence
whether a large depositor does business with a particular bank. These factors
include pricing, the availability of credit, the need to maintain compensating
balances under a loan agreement, convenience, capacity, and other important

34

Some commentators had suggested that depositors were ineffective risk-monitors
because of the so-called "too big to fail" doctrine, which made whole all of the
depositors of key banks, whether they were fully covered by deposit insurance or not.
The too big to fail doctrine may have been eradicated by a provision in FDICIA. See
FDICIA § 141(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(E)(i) (1994) (forbidding the FDIC from taking
"any action ... with respect to any insured depository institution that would have the
effect of increasing los§eS to any insurance fund").
35
This is what happened when the depositors holding volatile electronically-brokered
deposits that had been funding Continental Illinois decided to jump ship. See generally
Hilary Foulkes, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: The Rescue of Continental
Illinois National Bank and Trust Company, 1985 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 137, 139-40
(indicating the withdrawal of institutional accounts was one of the causes of failure for
Continental Illinois); Jeff Bailey et al., Anatomy of Failure: Continental Illinois, How
Bad Judgments and Big Ego Did It In, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1984, at A1 (describing the
factors which contributed to the failure of Continental Illinois).
36
See Garten, Revisited, supra note 5, at 196-97.
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considerations. 37 Against those factors the large depositor must weigh the
risk of failure, something it can help avoid by leaving its money in the bank,
and the likelihood that the "too big to fail" doctrine really is dead? 8
Finally, sophisticated large depositors may be able to avoid the pain of bank
failure by structuring their deposits in innovative ways. 39 Clever planning
will permit large depositors to structure their deposits so that the bulk of the
funds are covered by deposit insurance. Then the portion not covered by
insurance could be structured not as a deposit, but as a repurchase agreement
or other contractual arrangement that provides security to the "depositor" in
lieu of deposit insurance.40 Given the relative ease with which large deposi

31

See GEORGE H. HEMPEL ET AL., BANK MANAGEMENT 145-48 (2d ed. 1986).
While 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) ostensibly eliminates the too big to fail doctrine by
strengthening the requirement of "least cost resolution" on the FDIC's actions, it should
be noted that section 1823(c)(4) coexists with the statutory authority of the FDIC to
make payments in excess of the insurance coverage amounts if necessary to protect the
local economy where the bank failure occurred. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (1994).
How these two provisions will work together in the future remains to be seen.
3
~e statutory deposit insurance coverage limit of $100,000 can be expanded by
setting up accounts in different "rights and capacities." See Is That Deposit Insured or
Not?, A.B.A. BANKING J., Aug. 1990, at 20; Rick J. Taylor, Maximizing FDIC Coverage
at a Single Financial Institution, TAX MGMT. FIN. PLAN. J., July 21, 1992, at 267.
40
A repurchase agreement, or "repo," is a form of short-term secured loan, in which
the borrower "sells" a security, typically an obligation of the U.S. Treasury, to the lender
and at the same time the borrower agrees to repurchase the security at a given time and
price from the seller. The difference in the prices represents the interest on the loan. The
lender is protected from the borrower's failure to repurchase the security by having title
to the security and therefore the ability to sell the security on the secondary market.
Althoug~ repurchase agreements once were employed primarily as a method for banks
to lend money to each other for short periods of time, today many banks make these
arrangements available to deposit customers, especially those customers whose deposit
accounts exceed the deposit insurance limit. See generally Banks Weigh the Costs of
Deposit Insurance, A.B.A. BANKING J., Sept. 1991, at 41 (evaluating the effects of FDIC
insurance assessment increases on banks and their business structure and finding that
some banks use repurchase agreements as a source of alternative funds); Steve Cocheo,
Municipal Deposits: "Yes," "No," and "Maybe," A.B.A. BANKING J., Apr. 1992, at 22
(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of handling municipal deposits and
explaining banks' alternatives to these deposits such as 30-day repurchase agreements,
securities pledges, and term funds); Old Tool Brings New Bucks to Oregon Bank, A.B.A.
BANKING J., June 1991, at 7 (describing how National Bank of Oregon raised $152
million in medium-term funds through the use of bank notes, an attractive alternative to
traditional retail deposits because they are exempt from insurance assessments).
·
38
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tors can circumvent or at least substantially avoid the deposit insurance
limits, it appears that even the most sophisticated depositors may be poorly
suited for the role of monitor.

2.

Subordinated Debentureholders

Subordinated debentureholders were also considered well-suited to the
monitoring role for several reasons. 41 First, they were considered to have
the right degree of risk aversity, sandwiched as they are between the risk
taking equity holders and the risk-averse ordinary creditors.42 Second,
unlike depositors, they could not cause a bank run by withdrawing the funds
they had lent to the bank. 43 Third, because the debentureholders were the
first to lose money after the bank exhausted its equity, they had a great
incentive not to allow matters to deteriorate too far. 44 Fourth, they were
likely to possess a degree of financial sophistication that depositors
lacked.45 Finally, they had the potential to act as a group through the bond
trustee named in the indenture who is charged with monitoring the debt issue
on behalf of the debentureholders. 46
Indeed, lawmakers to some extent have adopted the idea that subordinat
ed debentureholders might be useful enforcers of market discipline, and have
changed the banking laws to create incentives for debentureholders to act as
monitors. For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improve
ment Act of 1991 47 ("FDICIA") prohibits critically undercapitalized
institutions from making payments on their subordinated debt. 48 This fman
cial threat could be effective to make debentureholders serve as vigilant
watchdogs of bank management. In reality, however, debentureholders will
not be effective monitors. As a practical matter, the holders of publicly
traded debt would rather switch than fight. That is, they have little incentive

41

See Evanoff, supra note 5, at 355--60.
See id. at 359.
43
See id.
44
See id.
45
See Jackson, supra note 30, at 596.
46
See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 8, at 269.
47
Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
48
FDICIA § 131, 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(h)(2) (1994).
42
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to stick around and make management act more prudently when they can sell
their holdings on the market and effectively limit their exposure.
Even if they wanted to police the bank's management, the
debentureholders would be too diffuse to do so effectively. With regard to
financial sophistication, little support exists for the proposition that
subordinated debentureholders have any special skill in assessing the health
of banks.49 Finally, although the debentureholders are likely to be represent
ed by an indenture trustee, in reality the trustee engages in only the most
pedestrian activities prior to an actual default on the debt issue. 50 In light
of these realities, subordinated debentureholders do not emerge as likely
candidates to enforce market discipline.

3.

The Market for Corporate Control

The idea that the market for corporate control might enforce market
discipline holds some intellectual appeal, 51 but once again reality intrudes
and spoils the party. In short, the market for corporate control idea provides
that poorly managed firms will trade at prices below their intrinsic value
because the market will discount for poor management. Once a poorly
managed firm becomes cheap enough, the market will recognize that the firm
is a bargain and parties seeking to control the firm will bid for it. The
bidding will stop at the point where the bidders believe the present value of
the improvements they will make in the target equals the price of the shares.
The ongoing threat of a takeover hangs over the heads of management and
forces them to do a good job or face the consequences. 52 This mechanism
does not provide meaningful monitoring in the banking context for several
reasons.
First, one must appreciate that in general the market for corporate
control is a very blunt tool for the task of providing a feedback mechanism

49

See R. Alton Gilbert, Market Discipline ofBank Risk: Theory and Evidence, ECON.
REV. (Federal Reserve Bank.of St. Louis), Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 3, 11-17.
5
0prior to default: the trustee is primarily concerned with "back office" operations
such as keeping track of the interest payments and sinking fund provisions. See Richard
B. Smith et al., The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 Needs No Conflict of Interest Revision,
35 BUS. LAW. 161, 163-67 (1979).
51
See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1202-25 (arguing for changes in the law to
make mergers easier).
52
See RICHARD E. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION
LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 195-96 (1980).
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for management.53 Second, not all banks could be in the market-some are
just too big to be in play, while others remain closely-held and not subject
to outside pressures. Third, institutions interested in acquiring banks realize
that they are better off fmancially to wait until the target bank actually fails,
when they can acquire the institution for very little, or perhaps even have the
receiver of the failed institution pay them to take over the bank. Fourth, it
has become increasingly obvious that combining banking institutions does
not necessarily result in a more efficient or profitable institution54 thereby
discouraging would-be acquirors from taking over would-be targets. Fifth,
takeover bids are expensive and often fail in the objective of gaining con
trol.55 In light of these realities, the market for corporate control loses its
promise as a means of enforcing market discipline.
~anagennent

4.

Some commentators have suggested that one good approach to reducing
the moral hazard problem generally is to impose personal liability on
corporate management.56 As a practical matter, bank managers have a great
deal to lose if the bank should fail; to a great extent their fortunes are tied
to the fortunes of the enterprise they manage. 57 Intuitively, bank managers'
great personal exposure would seem to make them ideal risk monitors.
Indeed, banking laws have traditionally tended to require that bank directors
be residents of the state in which the bank is located and that they have a
certain amount personally invested in the institution, presumably to ensure
that they would have some personal stake in the enterprise and thereby take

53

See Robert Charles Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92

HARV. L. REV. 789, 820 (1979) ("Yet takeovers have serious drawbacks. They are not

suitable for fine tuning of rewards and punishments ....").
54
See Stephen A. Rhoades, A Summary of Merger Performance Studies in Banking,
1980-93, and an Assessment of the "Operating Performance" and "Event Study"
Methodologies, Federal Reserve Board Staff Study No. 167 (1994) (surveying the results
of 39 studies analyzing the effects of bank mergers on efficiency, profitability and
shareholder wealth during the period 1980 through 1993 and concluding that the studies
provide little support for the view that bank mergers improve performance).
55
See Clark, supra note 53, at 820--21.
56
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 115-16.
51
See Utset, supra note 5, at 221-22.
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their duties seriously .58 Recent changes to the federal banking laws have
taken this approach as well and subjected bank officers and directors to
potentially huge liability for bank failure.
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
198959 ("FIRREA") significantly expanded the authority of the federal
regulatory agencies to assess civil money penalties while at the same time
increasing the amount of the penalties that they can assess. 60 Grounds for
assessing civil money damages include engaging in unsafe and unsound
practices, violating a written condition, violating a regulation or violating a
fiduciary .duty.61 In light of the last provision, the banking regulators could
58

See, e.g., National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 72 (1994) (stating that generally,
directors of national banks must be U.S. citizens and two-thirds of the board must have
been residents of the state in which their institution is located for at least one year prior
to election; and each director must own stock in the institution with a par value of $1000
or more, or an equivalent security in the bank holding company); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9-B, § 316 (West Supp. 1994) (requiring directors of state financial institutions to
own stock in the institution having a par value of at least $2500 or to be the nominee of
a holding company; and that two-thirds of the directors must be state residents); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 172, § 13 (1994) (requiring bank directors to own stock in the bank or
the company that owns the bank having a par value of at least $1000; and that three
fourths of the directors must be U.S. citizens and state residents).
5
3ub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12,
26 U.S.C.).
60
12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) authorizes three tiers of civil money penalties. Tier three
authorizes civil money penalties of up to $1 million per day against any institution-affili
ated party who(i) knowingly(!) commits any violation described in any clause of subparagraph (A) [which includes
any law, regulation, temporary or final cease-and-desist order, condition imposed in writing
by the federal banking agency in connection with the grant of any application or other
request, or any written agreement with the federal banking agency);
(II) engages in any unsafe or unsound practice in conducting the affairs of the
depository institution; or
(,,,) breaches any fiduciary duty; and
(ii) knowingly or recklessly causes a substantial loss to the depository institution
[because) of the violation, breach, or practice.

12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(C) (1994).
61
Exactly what fiduciary duties the directors of a bank owe and to whom they owe
them is a very difficult and under-analyzed question. The question becomes even more
complex when the bank is a subsidiary of a bank holding company. I have discussed this
problem in some detail in another article: Eric J. Gouvin, Resolving the Subsidiary
Director's Dilemma, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (1996). A moment's reflection on the
potentially wide-ranging scope of liability should give all bank officers and directors
nightmares.
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use their authority to assess penalties against subsidiary directors for
dividend payments, service fee payments, favorable participation
agreements or other transactions between the bank subsidiary and its
parent holding company. 62
FIRREA also broadened the banking regulators' powers by making
clear that they may use the cease-and-desist power to require restitution
or reimbursement in those cases where the violating party was unjustly
enriched and the violation involved a reckless disregard for the law, or
applicable regulations, or for violation of a prior order of the federal
banking agency. 63 Federal regulators may also use the cease-and-desist
authority to recover payments made to the holding company in violation
of orders, written agreements and regulations. 64
Holding bank directors personally liable may, however, be too harsh
and unfair. Most banks in the United States are subsidiaries of bank
holding companies, so therefore most bank directors are directors of
subsidiaries. Elsewhere I have advanced the idea that the directors of
subsidiaries, including bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies,
should not be subject to the usual fiduciary duties that the law imposes
on directors generally. 65 Instead, I have argued that subsidiary directors
should be bound only to take actions that are in the best interest of the
subsidiary's shareholder, the holding company. To the extent that the
law generally imposes duties on corporate directors that go above and
beyond looking out for the best interests of the shareholder, those duties
should be imposed on the holding comp~ny directly. I believe that
without the articulation of subsidiary directors' duties I have described,
the role of the subsidiary director is exceptionally difficult, if not
impossible, to discharge properly. 66 Because subsidiary directors fre

6

:znte National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 56, 60 (1994), may provide a receiver with
grounds for challenging actual or constructive dividends.
63
/d. § 1818(b)(6).
64
See id.
65
See Gouvin, supra note 61, at 294.
6
1The following hypothetical provides an illustration of diverging interests that
frequently confront bank directors: BHC Bancorp is a Delaware corporation regulated by
the Federal Reserve Board as a bank holding company. BHC owns all the shares of C
Bank, a commercial bank charted by the state of Connecticut, and N Bank, a national
bank that operates primarily in Maine. Assume also that BHC owns several subsidiaries
whose activities are "so related to the business of banking so as to be a proper incident
thereto," including such businesses as a courier service, a leasing company, a mortgage

1997]

SHAREHOLDER ENFORCED MARKET DISCIPLINE

327

quently find themselves trapped in what Professor Lawrence Mitchell
refers to as "horizontal conflicts"67 between their duty to the sharehold
er (holding company) and their duty to other constituencies (such as the

company and a data processing firm. Assume further that C Bank has run into serious
financial difficulties as a result of a dramatic and unforeseen economic downturn in its
market area. In order to shore up C Bank, the directors of the BHC direct N Bank to
transfer N Bank's lucrative credit card operation to C Bank. Assume this transfer can be
successfully carried out in light of inter-affiliate restrictions, of sections 23A and 23B of
the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c to 371c-1 (1994), but that the quality of the
collateral may or may not meet the requirements of those sections. Assume further that
if the directors of the bank subsidiary were making that decision on behalf of a truly
independent bank they never would approve the transaction. Nevertheless, in the context
of a bank holding company, a request by the holding company is likely to be approved
by the bank directors on the assumption that, at a minimum, they owe a fiduciary duty
to the bank's sole shareholder. Unfortunately for the bank's directors, if the transfers are
.ill-advised and the bank fails, the directors may find themselves the target of lawsuits
brought by the failed bank's receiver alleging breach of fiduciary duty for failure to take
action in the best interest of the corporation. See Gouvin, supra note 61, at 290-93.
Expecting the subsidiary banks' directors to disregard the directives of the holding
company is unrealistic. Putting bank management in the line of fire for the failure of
policies implemented by the holding company is unfair.
67
As Professor Mitchell describes:
These conflicts between virtually omnipotent managers and relatively powerless
constituents of the corporation (or the corporation itself) can be described as "vertical
conflicts of interest," since they exist between a powerful group and relatively
powerless groups within the hierarchical corporate structure .... The exception to this
unitary approach is the recent focus on conflicts among constituents, which has been
sharpened by the dislocations caused by the takeover phenomenon. I term these
conflicts, which exist among two or more relatively powerless groups that have
interests in the corporation, "horizontal conflicts."

Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REv. 579, 591 (1992); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell,
The Puzzling Paradox of Preferred Stock (And Why We Should Care About It), 51 Bus.
LAW. 443 (1996) (describing the tension between the directors' fiduciary duty and their
contractual duty to the preferred stockholders).

328

ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW

[Vol. 16:311

corporation itself as an entity, the insurance fund, and depositors), 68 it
is unfair to place the bank managers in a no win situation.

5.

Private Deposit Insurance

On another front, some have suggested that the deposit insurance
program be completely or partially privatized. 69 Although government
deposit insurance has long been considered necessary to doing business,
Canadian banks managed without it until1968.70 Alternatively, in some
states, non-banks are able to make do with state-sponsored or coopera-

7KHH
exact extent of bank directors' fiduciary duties remains unclear. One leading
treatise of banking law from the mid-nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth
century contained black letter passages like the following: The directors of a bank are
not trustees for the stockholders alone, but they owe an even earlier duty to the
depositors, and, if the bank exercises the privilege of circulation, still a prior duty to the
public at large." JOHN T. MORSE, JR., A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO BANKS
AND BANKING § 125, at 114 (2d ed. 1879); JOHN T. MORSE, JR., A TREATISE ON THE
LAW RELATING TO BANKS AND BANKING § 125, at 252 (3d ed. 1888); JOHN T. MORSE,
JR., A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BANKS AND BANKING § 125, at 264 (Frank Parsons
ed., 4th ed. 1903); JOHN T. MORSE, JR., A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO BANKS
AND BANKING § 125, at 256 (James N. Carter ed., 5th ed. 1917); JOHN T. MORSE JR.,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BANKS AND BANKING§ 125, at 317 (Harvey C. Voorhees
ed., 6th ed. 1928); see also 4 CARL ZOLLMANN, THE LAW OF BANKS AND BANKING
§ 2011, at 53 (1936) ("Directors occupy a fiduciary relation to the stockholders, creditors,
and depositors which demands of them careful attention, good faith, and honest
management."). As of the 1954 cumulative pocket part, the assertion had not been
changed by the editors of Morse's treatise. These fiduciary duties may continue to exist
in some form, together with duties that the directors may owe to the subsidiary bank as
an entity and duties. the directors may owe to creditors and other constituencies. See
Gouvin, supra note 61, at 307-15.
69
See, e.g., U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS Vll-8 to -11 (1990)
(reviewing practical proposals to reform and strengthen the federal deposit insurance
system, including a proposal to have a privately-operated and capitalized insurance
system within a framework established by the federal government); PETER J. WALLISON,
BACK FROM THE BRINK: A PRACTICAL PLAN FOR PRIVATIZING DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND
STRENGTHENING OUR BANKS AND THRIFTS (1990) (advocating restructuring the deposit
insurance system to rely on private contractual agreements to create incentives for banks
and S&Ls to be primarily responsible for safety and soundness of individual depository
institutions while retaining the benefits of the current depository insurance system).
10
See Fischel eta!., supra note 7, at 316--17.
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tive deposit insurance schemes. 71 On a very limited basis, Congress has
experimented with some privatization techniques by authorizing the
FDIC to engage in reinsurance of the deposit insurance risk. 72 Indeed,
some private insurers already offer insurance to cover the uninsured
portion of large deposit accounts. 73
While the idea of a privately-underwritten deposit insurance product
is intriguing, it raises many questions that have no answer at the present
time. 74 For example, it is not clear that depositors would voluntarily
buy such a policy when they could reasonably conclude that they can
get a free ride on other monitors who are keeping track of the bank's
activities. One might also wonder if an insurance company would ever
pay out on such a policy or if it would instead cancel the policy when
the bank got into serious trouble (just when the insurance is needed
most). The form of the insurance arrangement raises questions as well,
such as, would the insured be the bank itself or the depositor? Of
course, after more than sixty years in the deposit insurance business, the
government may find it politically impossible to exit the field. 75 In any
event, the immediate future does not hold a significant role for private
insurers as enforcers of market discipline on bank management.
6.

The Government

Regulators have imposed discipline to make banks more risk
sensitive through the examination process, regulatory policies, and
administrative actions. Another way that regulators could enforce market
discipline on banks would be to make the FDIC act more like a regular

71

See Victor L. Saulsbury, The Current Status of Non-Federal Deposit Insurance
Programs, ISSUES BANK REG., Spring 1985, at 3.
12
See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(B) (1994). For an excellent discussion of the many
issues raised by the possible use of the reinsurance market to help spread the risks of
deposit insurance, see Anna Kuzmik Walker, Harnessing the Free Market: Reinsurance
Models for FDIC Deposit Insurance Pricing, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 735 (1995).
13
See William W. Streeter, Excess Deposit Insurance, A.B.A. BANKING J., July 1993,
at 92.
74
For a general discussion, see Fischel et al., supra note 7, at 316-17.
15
See Jackson, supra note 30, at 600-01.
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private insurance company. 76 The law has already moved in this
direction. For example, common experience with other types of
insurance products tells us that insureds who engage in highly risky
activities (such as smoking, in the context of life insurance) have to pay
higher premiums than insureds who engage in less risky activities. The
FDIC now imposes such risk-based premiums on banks, 77 and, to some
extent, pegs deposit insurance premiums to a bank's exposure to interest
rate risk, credit risk, insider abuse, operating risk, and diversification
risk. 78 Risk-based premiums alone, however, could just exacerbate the
moral hazard problem. If a risky bank has to pay higher insurance
premiums, it may need to invest the deposits it receives in riskier,
higher-yielding assets in order to get the return necessary to cover its
costs and provide an acceptable return to its investors.
Although the government might tinker with deposit insurance to
make it mimic private insurance, the attempt is probably going to
produce results that are not entirely satisfactory. The idea of using
regulation to emulate private market forces suffers from a deep flaw:
government regulators do not possess the wherewithal to effectively
serve as surrogate private actors. The government regulators are not
animated by the same forces that make private parties act. Furthermore,
the government actors do not have any personal stake in the success of
the risk monitoring enterprise, and in any event, even a conscientious
regulator can be trumped by political forces. 79 The government
therefore does not seem to be a strong candidate to serve as a provider
of consistent and meaningful discipline.

76

For a general discussion of the pros and cons of this idea, see James R. Barth et

al., Reforming Federal Deposit Insurance: What Can Be Learned from Private Insurance
Practices?, 45 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. 140, No.2 (1991).
71
See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(A) (1994).
18
See James S. Chessen, How FDIC's Risk-Based Insurance Premiums Work, A.B.A.
BANKERS WKLY., Oct. 6, 1992, at 8 (explaining that under FDICIA banks will pay a
risk-based deposit insurance premium to be determined by the bank's capital and
supervisory rating).
7
~ven though the regulatory agencies are ostensibly independent, political forces
affect their agendas. See generally L. WILLIAM SEIDMAN, FuLL FAITH AND CREDIT: THE
GREAT S&L DEBACLE AND OTHER WASHINGTON SAGAS (1993) (memoirs of a former
FDIC chairman illustrating the constant interplay of political forces and regulatory
policy).
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Shareholders

In the end, the law has evolved primarily to place the burden of
enforcing market discipline on the shareholders, which in most cases
means bank holding companies. 80 This development has come as
something of a surprise because shareholders are often perceived as less
than ideal monitors. 81 The reasons for this perception are several. First,
of all the potential monitors interested in keeping bank managers from
taking too many risks, shareholders, as the residual takers in the firm,
seem to be the stakeholders most inclined to take risks. 82 Indeed, the
more risk the firm takes through heavy use of leverage, the greater the
returns on an equity investment. 83 Second, the moral hazard problem
arises when shareholders have nothing to lose, so just when their
monitoring services would be most needed-when failure is immi
nent-their incentive to act as monitors is very low. Finally, the realities
of the equity market show that shareholders usually vote with their
feet. 84 That is, they do not suffer through the bad times, but instead
sell their shares and move on to the next investment.
The fallacy in the reasoning leading to the conclusion that bank
shareholders would make poor risk monitors is the failure to appreciate
that bank holding companies85 control the vast majority of U.S.

80

As of 1994, bank holding companies controlled banks holding 92.9% of the
banking deposits in the country. See Dean F. Amel, Trends in the Structure of Federally
Insured Depository Institutions, 1984-94, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 1, 5 (1996).
81
See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 8, at 268.
82
See Garten, Revisited, supra note 5, at 202.
83
See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 8, at 268.
84
See JOSEPH A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 60-61 (1958).
85
As defined by statute, a bank holding company is any company that has control
over a bank or over a company that has control of a bank. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1)
(1994). Typically, although not always, bank holding companies are corporations. See
generally id. § 1841(b) (defining bank holding company to mean any "corporation,
partnership, business trust, association, or similar organization"). The bank holding
company itself is merely a regular corporation formed under state incorporation laws.
Although bank holding companies do not require special charters, they are regulated by
the Federal Reserve Board under the Bank Holding Company Act. See Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994). Bank holding companies may
engage in. activities through their non-banking subsidiaries which banks may not
participate in directly. For a general discussion of the issues involved in the lines of busi
ness in which bank holding companies are allowed to engage, see James R. Smoot,
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banks. 86 Many debates concerning banking policy discuss bank share
holders as if they were like the widely scattered, unaffiliated shareholders
of public corporations, when clearly that is not the case. In light of, or
perhaps in spite of, the special relationship between banks and bank holding
companies, 87 shareholders have emerged as the preferred monitors of bank
management.
The most effective way to make bank shareholders care about whether
the bank succeeds or fails is to ensure that they have enough capital at stake
so that failure becomes a very unpalatable option. 88 The genius of recent
reforms has been to link the capital requirements to the risks that a bank
undertakes. 89 While increased capital requirements alone should be enough
to make bank holding companies more attentive to the possibility of bank
failure and more conservative with risk-taking, as the following section
discusses, the regulatory devices designed to make bank holding companies
impose market discipline extend far beyond capital requirements.

Striking Camp and Moving to Higher Ground: The Hazardous Subtleties of "Subtle
Hazards" in Bank Regulation, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 21 (1995).
8
&r'he reasons for the predominance of the bank holding company structure can be
attributed to various historical, economic and political forces. Bank holding companies
can be seen as a marketplace response to the restrictive laws affecting the banking
industry. While banks were restricted as to the kinds of businesses they could engage in
and where they could branch, bank holding companies did not face those restrictions, and
provided an effective way to avoid the constraints of the banking laws. See generally
MACEY & MILLER, supra note 8, at 293-96 (discussing reasons for restricting bank
holding companies); Clark, supra note 53, at 816 (same).
87
For a description of this special relationship, see Gouvin, supra note 61, at 289-90 ·
(noting the control that bank holding companies exert over their bank subsidiaries). See
also Clark, supra note 53, at 819-22 (discussing the need for regulation to correct the
potential abuses inherent in the parent/subsidiary relationship).
88
See U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDA
TIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS (1991), reprinted in [1990-1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) C)[ 88,367, at 97,335 (Feb. 8, 1991) (expressing the
view that "banks are less likely to take excessive risk when they have substantial
amounts of their own money at stake").
'
89
See 12 C.P.R. § 208.13 & app. A (1996); FDIC Capital Maintenance; Statement
of Policy On Risk-Based Capital, id. pt. 325; Comptroller of the Currency Risk-Based
Capital Guidelines, id. pt. 3 & app. A.
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ill. THE IMPOSITION OF LIABILITY ON BANK
HOLDING COMPANIES
Traditionally, bank holding companies, while subject to some prophylac
tic regulations designed to keep them out of certain businesses, have
generally not been saddled with many affirmative regulatory obligations with
respect to their subsidiary banks.90 More recently, however, the regulatory
burdens imposed on bank holding companies have grown. The banking
regulators have attempted to hold bank holding companies responsible for the
health of their subsidiaries through various strategies, with varying degrees
of success. This section discusses each of those developments in tum. Each
development, as will be shown, creates potential liability for the bank's
shareholders, and in doing so creates an incentive for bank holding
companies not only to monitor the risks that their bank subsidiaries
undertake, but to actively avoid risks that the bank might undertake. In this
sense the regulatory devices are all adjuncts to the market discipline scheme
and work to make bank equity holders the chief enforcers of market disci
pline.
A. Source of Strength Doctrine

Probably the most celebrated method for imposing a duty on the
holding company to monitor its bank subsidiaries is the Federal Reserve
Board's "source of strength" doctrine. 91 Much has been written about

90

See Jackson, supra note 30, at 516-17.
1t is important to note that the source of strength doctrine is based on Federal
Reserve Board policy, not on legislative mandate. The banking regulators have attempted
to have Congress pass legislation specifically authorizing the source of strength doctrine.
In 1988, for example, the regulators supported a proposal that would have empowered
the Federal Reserve Board to require a bank holding ,company and its non-bank
subsidiaries to contribute or transfer to any failing bank within Ute holding company
system "such assets or services as are customarily utilized by a bank in the conduct of
its business or operations." Emergency Bank Consolidation Act of 1988, 134 CONG. REC.
S11,441 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1988). To date, those efforts have been unsuccessful,
although FIRREA did contain cross-guarantee provisions that serve similar ends. See
Federal Deposit Insurance Act§ 5(e), amended by FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e) (1994);
infra notes 138-145 and accompanying text.
91
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it, 92 and a brief summary will serve the purposes of this discussion. The
Federal Reserve Board ("Fed" or "FRB"}, as the regulator of bank holding
companies,93 has articulated the source of strength doctrine as the comer
stone of bank holding company regulation. 94 The doctrine requires that the
bank holding company assist bank subsidiaries in difficult financial thnes by
providing financial assistance to failing bank subsidiaries.95
In 1987 the Fed issued a Policy Statement reiterating its understanding
of the source of strength doctrine as an independent legal obligation imposed
on bank holding companies to support bank subsidiaries, including capital
infusions, if necessary .96 It further states that violation of the source of
92
See, e.g., Leonard Biennan & Donald R. Fraser, The "Source of Strength"
Doctrine: Formulating the Future of America's Financial Markets, 12 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 269 (1993) (addressing controversy surrounding the promulgation and
application of the source of strength doctrine); Jackson, supra note 30, at 528-32
(discussing Federal Reserve Board's 1987 policy statement of the source of strength
doctrine and its ensuing application to the MCorp case); Kieran J. Fallon, Note, Source
of Strength or Source of Weakness?: A Critique of the "Source of Strength" Doctrine in
Banking Reform, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344 (1991) (criticizing the source of strength
doctrine in banking refonn).
93
See 12 U.S.C. § 1844 (1994).
94-Jbe "source of strength" doctrine is codified in the Federal Reserve -Board's
Regulation Y, which states that "a bank holding company shall serve as a source of
financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks." 12 -C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1)
(1996).
.
9
s.rbe doctrine grows out of the Federal Reserve Board policy governing the
fonnation of bank holding companies. In 1976, the Fed denied an application by First
Lincolnwood Corporation to fonn a bank holding company on the ground that the
applicant would not be able to "provide a source of financial and managerial strength to
its subsidiary bank(s)." First Lincolnwood Corp., 62 Fed. Res. Bull. 153 (1976). In the
resulting litigation over the Fed's authority to deny the application, the Supreme Court
held that the FRB could deny an application on grounds of financial and managerial
weakness. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439
U.S. 234, 250 (1978). Citing the FRB's source of strength policy, the Supreme Court
decided that the Fed could deny the application even when the application was not the
cause of the financial weakness or would not exacerbate it. /d. at 251.
96
See Responsibility of Bank Holding Companies to Act as Sources of Strength to
Their Subsidiary Banks, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707 (1987). Acting under its statutory authority
to regulate bank holding companies, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System reiterated its long-standing policy that bank holding companies act as sources of
strength to subsidiary banks by using holding company resources to provide adequate
capital to subsidiary banks during periods of financial stress or adversity. A bank holding
company's failure to assist a troubled or failing subsidiary bank under these circum
stances would generally be viewed as an unsafe and unsound banking practice or a
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strength doctrine constitutes an "unsafe or unsound" banking practice,97 or
a violation of Regulation Y, or both, thereby establishing grounds to impose
administrative sanctions.98
The first big test for the Fed's source of strength policy statement came
in MCorp v. Board of Governors, in which a bank holding company sought
and received relief in the federal district court enjoining the FRB from
proceeding with pending administrative actions that would have forced the
holding company to inject additional resources into its failing banks.99 On
appeal, tlle Fifth Circuit reversed the district court decision on procedural
grounds. 100 In so doing, however, the Fifth Circuit found that the FRB had
exceeded its statutory authority by using the source of strength doctrine to
require MCorp to transfer funds to its subsidiary banks. 101 The Fifth Circuit
found that the support the FRB claimed to have under its regulations and
policy statements exceeded its statutory authority, fmding that "Congress
never intended to grant authority to the [FRB] to require a holding company
to inject capital into subsidiary banks as a safeguard against 'unsafe or

violation of Regulation Y or both. See id. at 15,707-08. In support of its policy the FRB
cited the First Lincolnwood decision, and the incorporation of the source of strength
doctrine into Regulation Y in 1984. See Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank
Control, 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1) (1996).
97
"Generally speaking, an 'unsafe or unsound' practice embraces any action, or lack
·of action, which is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation, the
possible consequences of which, if continued, would be abnormal risk of loss or damage
to an institution, its shareholders, or the insurance fund administered by the corporation."
Overdrafts and Correspondent Banking Practices: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 782 (1977) (statement of George
LeMaistre, chairman, FDIC), quoted in EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR. & JAMES J. WHITE,
BANKING LAW 554 (3d ed. 1991).
98
12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) provides the federal regulatory agencies with an arsenal of
administrative sanctions that may be employed to remedy: (l) an unsafe or unsound
practice; or (2) a violation of a law, rule or regulation, any condition imposed in writing
by the agency in connection with the granting of any application or other request, or any
writte!l agreement entered into with the agency.
~Corp v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 101 B.R. 483 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1989), rev'd in part and vacated in part, 900 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd on
other grounds, 502 U.S. 32 (1991).
1
«»rhe circuit court ruled that 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(l) prohibited the district court
from enjoining an FRB administrative proceeding unless the FRB had exceeded its
statutory authority. MCorp, 900 F.2d at 857.
101
/d. at 860--62.
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unsound' practices." 102 The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the Fifth
Circuit on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of MCorp's
challenge to the source of strength doctrine. 103
The status of the source of strength doctrine therefore remains an open
question. Because the Federal Reserve Board continues to apply the source
of strength doctrine to the bank holding companies it regulates, 104 clearly
'it is still a tool for shifting the costs of bank failure to the holding company
when such a shift is convenient for the banking regulators.

B. Regulatory Agreements
Regulatory agreements serve as another method of extracting resources
from a bank holding company. Regulators and the institutions they regulate
have for some time entered into agreements to define the type of mutually
agreeable relationship they desire. 105 The agreements are enforced primarily
through administrative actions, informal negotiations and, in some cases,
litigation.

102

/d. at 863.
MCorp, 502 U.S. at 37-44. The Supreme Court held that 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1)
prohibits the district court from enjoining an ongoing administrative proceeding before
a banking agency until the banking agency issues a final order. /d.
104
E.g., Deutsche Bank AG, 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 133, 137 (1993); Bane One Corp., 78
Fed. Res. Bull. 159, 161 (1992).
105
Thrift regulators routinely required persons in control of savings and loan associa
tions to enter into a contractual version of the source of strength doctrine. See 12 C.P.R.
§ 571.6(d)(4) (1996) (imposing net worth maintenance agreements in connection with the
requirements for obtaining a de novo charter for an association). But see id. § 574.8(c)(2)
(stating that failure to enter into net worth agreements in connection with stock issuances
by undercapitalized associations will not result in a denial of application to acquire
shares). As a condition of approval, the agreement between the regulator and the party
seeking control of the thrift imposed an ongoing duty to maintain the capital of the
savings and loan association at or above required levels and to contribute additional
capital to the S&L if necessary to maintain the required levels. These agreements
sometimes took the form of an "affidavit" or "stipulation" signed by the party seeking
control. Sometimes the agreement took the form of letters between the regulator and the
acquiring party, and, more recently, the agreements have taken the form of a formal
"capital maintenance agreement," signed by the regulator and the acquiror. See Paul L.
Lee, Liability of Bank Holding Companies, Savings and Loan Holding Companies and
Their Affiliates for Failed Bank and Thrift Subsidiaries, in COUNSELLING CREDITORS OF
BANKS AND THRIFTS: DEALING WITH THE FDIC AND RTC at 363, 379 (PLI Commercial
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 561, 1991).
103
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In the hands of the regulators, the written agreements appear to provide
a great deal of leverage. The Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") has
authority to initiate a cease-and-desist proceeding106 if a party has violated
any condition imposed in writing by the agency in connection with an
application or request or )las violated any written agreement entered into with
the agency .107 When both the acquiror and the agency sign written capital
maintenance agreements, there may be a strong argument that these
documents constitute written agreements for purposes of section
1818(b)(l). 108 In addition, the OTS has the authority to assess civil money
penalties in the amount of up to $1 million per day for knowing violations
of conditions imposed in writing by the regulatory agency or knowing
violations of written agreements if a substantial loss is caused thereby to the
depository institution. 109
While violation of written agreements may provide regulators with some
leverage over persons in control of financial institutions, the validity of
imposing capital maintenance as a condition of regulatory approval is subject
to challenge. The regulators can rely on precedent to support their position
that imposing conditions is within their authority. 110 Regulated parties,
however, have argued with some success that "net worth maintenance agree
ments" are not enforceable contracts, but are rather part of the regulatory
approval process. 111

106

See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1994).
The federal banking regulators have brought cease-and-desist actions to enforce
''net worth maintenance agreements" on this basis with mixed results. Compare Wachtel
v. OTS, 982 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (maintaining a skeptical attitude toward the
administrative remedy in the context of capital maintenance agreements), with Akin v.
OTS, 950 F.2d 1180, 1186 (5th Cir. 1992) (expressing general support of the administra
tive remedy approach).
108
See Akin, 950 F.2d at 1183-84. On the other hand, the OTS's position may be
weaker where the obligation takes the form of a "stipulation," "affidavit" or set of letters.
109
See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (1994).
110
See, e.g., Kaneb Servs., Inc. v. FSLIC, 650 F.2d 78,82 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding
a restriction on the payment of dividends imposed as a condition of regulatory approval,
reasoning that Congress had delegated to the FSLIC broad authority to regulate
acquisitions).
111
This theory has been successfully employed to dismiss suits by RTC/FDIC as
"third party beneficiaries" seeking to enforce the agreements. See In re Conner Corp.,
127 B.R. 775, 780 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1991), aff'g No. 87-01697-M04, 1990 WL
124052 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.June 20, 1990); RTC v. Savers, Inc., No. LR-C-89-529, 1990
WL 290314 (E.D. Ark. June 12, 1990); RTC v. Tetco, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1159 (W.D.
107
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The significance of such agreements may be fading in light of the power
granted to banking regulators under FDICIA to require and enforce capital
restoration plans. 112 Even so, these agreements still represent a method by
which the regulators may extract additional fmancial commitments from bank
holding companies in an effort to stave off failure of a financial institution.
They should have the effect of making bank holding companies even more
leery of risk-taking at the bank subsidiary level.

C. Capital Restoration Plans
FDICIA requires institutions defmed as "undercapitalized" to submit a
capital restoration plan ("CRP") to the institution's federal banking
agency .113 If a bank holding company controls the fmancial institution,
FDICIA prohibits the banking agency from approving the CRP unless the
holding company guarantees compliance with the CRP for one year and
provides adequate assurances of compliance. 114
While CRPs are yet another example of how the regulators have found
a way to impose the costs of bank distress onto bank holding companies, the
CRP also provides some benefit to the bank holding company. By guarantee
ing the subsidiary's obligation under a CRP, the holding company limits its
direct liability for the institution's failure to the lower of either "an amount
equal to 5 percent of the institution's total assets at the time the institution
became undercapitalized" or "the amount which is necessary (or would have
been necessary) to bring the institution into compliance with all capital
standards applicable" at the time the institution failed to comply with the
plan.tts
On the other hand, if the fmancial institution fails to submit a plan or
to implement a plan that has been submitted and approved, FDICIA provides
the regulators with a number of sanctions to employ against the institution,
including the power to seize the institution. 116 It should be noted, however,
that no provision of FDICIA expressly requires a holding company to

Tex. 1990), vacated by agreement, No. 91-5612,\1992 WL 437650 (5th Cir. Apr. 22,
1992).
112
12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)(2) (1994).
113
/d. § 1831o(e)(2)(D)(i}-(ii).
114
/d. § 1831o(e)(2)(C)(ii)(l).
115
/d. § 1831o(e)(2)(E).
116
/d. § 1831o(g)(3).
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guarantee compliance with a subsidiary's CRP. 117 The optional aspect of
these plans may have been designed to facilitate early resolution of the
insured institutions by requiring the holding company to either make a
financial commitment to the subsidiary's continued survival, or, alternatively
to decline such a commitment and in doing so indicate to the regulators that
the holding company is willing to let the subsidiary fail. 118 While this
arrangement provides the holding company with some flexibility regarding
the commitment to the troubled subsidiary, failure to back a CRP could have
catastrophic results for the holding company. Without the limitations created
by the guarantee of the CRP, holding company liability for the bank's failure
could be great, and failure to back up the CRP could raise the ire of the
regulators who could find ways to punish an uncooperative holding
company. So, when viewed in a more skeptical light, the apparent leeway
afforded by the CRP provisions could in reality be nothing more than an
invitation to play a high stakes game of "chicken" with the regulators.

D. Fiduciary Duty to Regulators
Federal banking regulators have discussed the existence of a fiduciary
duty running from the insured fmancial institution directly to the insurance
fund. 119 If such a duty exists, it would create yet another incentive for bank
holding companies to monitor bank management because the duty to the
federal government would necessarily come at the expense of the existing
duty to the bank's shareholders. 120 If granted standing, the banking regula
tors could bring suit against insured institutions for breaching this fiduciary

117

See Cassandra Jones Havard, Back to the Parent: Holding Company Liability for
Subsidiary Banks-A Discussion of the Net Worth Maintenance Agreement, the Source
of Strength Doctrine, and the Prompt Corrective Action Provision, 16 CARDOZO L. REV.
2353, 2388 (1995).
118
See Carnell, supra note 29, at 339.
11
~e most complete articulation of this idea was given by Harris Weinstein, Chief
Counsel to the Office of Thrift Supervision, in a speech he delivered at Southern
Methodist University in 1990. By drawing analogies to the law of bankruptcy, Mr.
Weinstein concluded that insured banks and their fiduciaries owe the federal government
a general fiduciary duty "not to risk insolvency and the resulting loss of funds deposited
with the institution." Speech by OTS Chief Counsel Weinstein on Duties of Depository
Institution Fiduciaries, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) 510, 511 (Sept. 24, 1990).
120
See Lawrence G. Baxter, Fiduciary Issues in Federal Banking Regulation, 56 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 18-19 (1993).
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duty to the insurance fund. 121 Any recovery of damages would mean less
for the residual taker, the holding company, and under the cross-guarantee
provisions, could mean an even larger liability for affiliated institutions. 122
Commentators who have considered this issue have largely dismissed
the idea of a free-floating fiduciary duty to the insurance fund as inappropri
ate from the perspective of regulatory policy, 123 from the perspective of
portfolio theory, 124 and from the perspective of the institution affiliated
parties that would have to discharge the duty. 125 Whether the general fidu
ciary duty idea is dead or merely hibernating is not known at this time. In
· any event, it remains a possible source of financial obligation for bank
holding companies.
E. Equitable Subordination

The FDIC also has employed the bankruptcy doctrine of equitable
subordination to reach indirectly the holding company's resources to help
pay for the resolution of failed financial institutions. Grounded in the case
of Pepper v. Litton, 126 the equitable subordination doctrine holds that when
the owners of a bankrupt enterprise have engaged in inequitable conduct, the
claims of ownership against the bankrupt estate should be subordinated to the
claims of other bankruptcy creditors to the extent necessary to correct the

121
In addition, the existence of such a duty could be an affirmative ground for the
government to recover additional monies from institution affiliated parties because,
among other things, the banking agencies are authorized to seek civil money damages
for violations offiduciary duties. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(B)(i)(lll), (C)(i)(lll) (1994).
122
See infra notes 138-145 and accompanying text.
123
See Baxter, supra note 120, at 10 (demonstrating that although a fiduciary duty to
the regulator is theoretically plausible, Congress has already supplanted the need for a
general fiduciary duty by enacting a detailed regulatory scheme and imposing the duty
to act safely and soundly).
124
See Andrew J. Nussbaum, Like Money in the Bank? An Economic Analysis of
Fiduciary Duties to Protect the S&L Deposit Insurance Fund, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 355,
359-71 (1992) (employing portfolio theory to show the economic inefficiency of such
a rule and its negative consequences).
msee Keith R. Fisher, Nibbling on the Chancellor's Toesies: A "Roguish" Concur
rence with Professor Baxter, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 48-50 (1993) (pointing
out that the new fiduciary duty would be imposed on parties, such as attorneys, whose
fiduciary duty runs only to the client, with no direction on how to accommodate the new
duty).
126
308 u.s. 295 (1939).
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harm done to those non-owner claimants by the inequitable conduct. 127 The
FDIC, in its role as receiver, has raised this doctrine in several cases,
especially in states like Texas where the holding company structure is merely
a way around branching restrictions and the separate banks of the system act
·like one large branching system. 128
In these situations some banks in the holding company system fail while
other banks remain solvent. Frequently the affiliates within the holding
company system owe each other monetary obligations. The FDIC adopted
a policy of equitably subordinating the inter-affiliate claims. 129 The equita
ble subordination approach failed to win the support of the court in the
MCorp litigation. 130
The FDIC as receiver also has employed a related but slightly different
approach to achieve the same ends by discriminating between affiliated and
non-affiliated claims in the resolution process. By giving non-affiliated
claims a payout premium that affiliated claims do not share, the FDIC can
achieve results in the resolution of banks in a multi-bank holding company
that more closely resemble the results that would obtain from the resolution
of a branched-based bank of similar size. 131
This approach has a real impact for bank holding companies because the
entities controlled by a bank holding company commonly share their capital
resources. Elaborate arrangements for intra-company loans, repurchase
agreements, debentures, lines of credit, correspondent banking relationships,
participation agreements, and other sorts of financial engineering keep the
affiliates in close dependence on each other. 132 The FDIC approach holds
great power because the financial arrangements between stronger and weaker
affiliates expose the stronger affiliates to the risk of insolvency if the weaker
affiliates fail. As it commonly does in resolving failed institutions, in the
MCorp case, the FDIC as receiver transferred substantially all the bank assets

121

See id. at 306, 308-10. For example, the FDIC could treat a holding company's
loans to a failed bank as equity.
128
See MCorp v. Clarke, 755 F. Supp. 1402 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
129
E.g., Texas Am. Bancshares, Inc. v. Clarke, 740 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Tex. 1990),
rev'd 954 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1992); MBank New Braunfels, N.A. v. FDIC, 721 F. Supp.
120 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
130
See MCorp, 755 F. Supp. at 141&-17.
131
See Texas Am. Bancshares, 954 F.2d at 337-38.
132
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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and liabilities to new "bridge banks," but it left behind in the "bad bank" the
liabilities due to the holding companies and their healthy affiliate banks. 133
Leaving the holding company and affiliate claims behind in the bad
banks resulted in those claims being worth next to nothing. The reduction in
value of those claims had a domino effect on the balance sheets of the
healthy affiliates. The FDIC' s use of this technique was successfully
challenged as a violation of the National Bank Act's requirement that claims
against a bank receive "ratable" treatment. 134 In MBank New Braunfels,
N.A. v. FDIC, 135 the district court found that this disparate treatment violat
ed the ratable treatment requirement, despite the FDIC's argument that the
action was justified because the National Bank Act requires only that the
claims left in the receivership receive as much as they would have received
in a straight liquidation of the bank's assets. 136
To strengthen the FDIC's hand in the resolution of failed institutions,
FIRREA amended the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to set the FDIC's
maximum liability on any claim at the amount that the claimant would have
received if the FDIC had simply liquidated the failed bank without the use
of FDIC funds. 137 This amendment has the practical effect of overturning
contrary case law, and establishing the FDIC's authority to treat affiliate and
non-affiliate obligations differently. As a result, stronger affiliates in a bank
holding company system are now at much greater risk when dealing with
weaker affiliates in intra-company financial transactions. Indirectly, this
amounts to increased liability for the bank holding company, because some
of its wealth, i.e., the value of its strong affiliates, is transferred to the failed
institution.

F. Cross-Guarantee Provisions
Like the affiliate obligations that may be equitably subordinated, the
cross-guarantee provisions of FIRREA 138 are not technically obligations of
the holding company; but they have the effect of indirectly transferring

133

See MBank New Braunfels, 721 F. Supp. at 122.
See 12 U.S.C. § 194 (1994).
135
721 F. Supp. at 120 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
136
/d. at 123-25; accord Texas Am. Bancshares, Inc. v. Clarke, 740 F. Supp. 1243
(N.D. Tex. 1990).
137
FIRREA § 212(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(i)(2) (1994).
138
12 U.S.C. § 1815(e) (1994).
134
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holding company assets by making affiliates liable for each other. FIRREA
gave the FDIC, when acting as conservator or receiver of an insured
depository institution, or when providing emergency assistance to allow an
insured institution to remain in business, the power to assess other depository
institutions controlled by the same holding company for any loss that the
FDIC incurs or anticipates that it will incur in disposing of or assisting the
insured institution. 139 In a sense, the cross-guarantee provisions allow the
FDIC to aggregate all of the banking subsidiaries of a bank holding company
and treat them as one functional bank.
Although the cross-guarantee provisions do not operate to take funds
from the holding company or its non-banking subsidiaries directly, the
assessments that the FDIC charges against the holding company's otherwise
healthy banking subsidiaries could be significant enough to render them
insolvent as well, thereby resulting in a significant transfer of wealth from
one holding company asset to another. 140 The cross-guarantee provisions
have been challenged as unconstitutional takings, 141 but the Supreme Court
has yet to settle the issue. 142
In any event, recent changes in branching laws may presage the end of
the multi-bank holding company era. As of the end of 1994, there were no
more unit banking states and only two states that did not permit branching
on a state-wide basis. 143 In addition, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994144 permits nationwide branching after

1391d.
1

~s is exactly the situation that transpired when Bank of New England ("BNE")
collapsed in the late 1980s. BNE's healthy sister bank, Maine National Bank, was served
with an assessment to make good the costs that the FDIC anticipated in bailing out BNE.
The assessment was sufficient to render Maine National insolvent as well. See William
F. Sheehan & Celestine R. McConville, FIRREA 's Cross-Guarantee Provisions, Solvent
Banks, and the Fifth Amendment, 112 BANKING L.J. 574, 575-76 (1995).
141
ln Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. FDIC, 868 F. Supp. 29 (D. Conn. 1994),
aff'd, 62 F.3d 449 (2d Cir. 1995), the cross-guarantee provision was found to be
constitutional, while in Branch ex rel. Maine National Bank v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl.
626 (1994), rev'd, 69 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 1996 WL 247226 (Oct.
7, 1996), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court and held
that the cross-guarantee provision creates a special exception to the normal rule of
limited corporate liability and is not a taking.
142
For a general discussion, see Jennifer J. Alexander, Note, Is The Cross-Guarantee
Constitutional?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1741 (1995).
143
See Amel, supra note 80, at 3.
144
Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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June 1, 1997, thereby negating the requirement that holding companies
operating in several states have a bank chartered in each of those states. 145

G. Preferences and Fraudulent Conveyances
Like the trustee in bankruptcy, 146 the FDIC as receiver of a national
bank has the power to avoid transfers made with the intent of either prevent
ing the ratable application of the failed bank's assets or preferring one
creditor to another. 147 Although somewhat less· well-developed than its
bankruptcy counterpart, the banking version of preference law has started to
come into its own as a tool for clawing assets into the failed institution's
coffers. 148 Given the vast array of obligations running between holding
companies and their bank subsidiaries, the preference could be a very
effective way for the FDIC as receiver to force a holding company to justify
each and every transaction entered into during the period of insolvency.
Under this approach, all payments made by a failed bank to its holding
company and affiliates will be closely scrutinized as possible preferences.
Similarly, fraudulent conveyance law provides another avenue through
which the FDIC can attack the validity of a financial institution's asset
transfers in the period leading up to insolvency. Support for a fraudulent
conveyance theory might be found in state law or federal common law, 149
and would require the FDIC to show either intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors, or receipt of inadequate consideration. 150 In 1991 with the
passage of FDICIA, Congress adopted a federal standard for fraudulent

145

As of this writing, only Texas had opted out of the Riegle-Neal branching
provisions. See Interstate Branching: Who's Opting In, Who's Opting Out, Who's
Looking at the Options, 87 A.B.A., BANKING J., Oct. 1995, at 22.
146
See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994).
141
See 12 U.S.C. § 91 (1994).
148
See, e.g., FDIC v. Goldberg, 906 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1990) (denying an investor
in a failed institution the opportunity to walk away when board "rescinded" his
subscription agreement for additional stock after the institution was declared insolvent).
14
9por a discussion of the impact of O'Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048
(1994), on federal common law, see Michael D. Floyd, Could D'Oench Be Doomed? The
Impact ofO'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 15 ANN. REV. BANKINQ L. 325 (1996).
15
~ost states have modeled their fraudulent conveyance law on either the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act or the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Cf UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7a U.L.A. § 7, at 155-56 (Supp. 1996); UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Acr, 7a U.L.A. § 5, at 209-10 (Supp. 1996).
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conveyances. 151 The statutory standard permits ~ receiver or conservator for
an insured depository institution to avoid cerulin transfers made with the
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the depository institution, the FDIC or any
other appropriate federal banking agency .152

IV. RETIDNKING THE SHAREHOLDER'S ROLE IN
MARKET DISCIPLINE
The regulatory strategy of using non-regulators to keep a check on bank
management makes sense-to a point. Increasing managerial accountability
is an admirable goal, since there can be no doubt that management
weaknesses contributed to the banking and thrift crises of the 1980s and
early 1990s. 153 But the goal of implementing stringent management
oversight may be easier to state than to execute. As the autopsies of failed
institutions roll in, management factors seem to play an important role in the
failures, but most of these lapses constitute garden variety negligence. 154

m12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17)(A) (1994).
mid.
15
~e Congressional Budget Office reports that a study by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency found that so-called "management-driven weaknesses"
played a "significant role~· in ~e decline of 90% of the resolved and problem banks.
CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 19-20; see also Comptroller of the Currency, Bank
Failure: An Evaluation of the Factors Contributing to the Failure of National Banks,
[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) '1[87,387, at 93,979 (June
1988) (discussing OCC study which concluded that policies and procedures of a bank's
management and board of directors have greater influence on success or failure than
economic conditions).
15
"The CBO hastened to add, however, that "[t]hese results do not imply that 90
percent of bank losses can be attributed to management problems, nor does it mean that
different management could have averted 90 percent of bank failures." CBO STUDY,
supra note 15, at 20. It should be noted that these findings for individual bank
resolutions are based on subjective evaluations of examiners who set out to list a group
of factors contributing to the failure of a particular bank. Even with the most sophisticat
ed techniques, distinguishing between management quality and the economic environment
in which banks operate is obviously difficult; the categories are not mutually exclusive.
See id. As a witness to several bank examinations done during the relevant time period,
I would add the caveat that the post mortem analysis was performed by examiners with
precious little banking experience, who tend to have a strong belief in written policies
to the exclusion of all else. As the banking crisis unfolded, the existing corps of
examiners was stretched to the limit and newer examiners went into the field with less
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Although I am unaware of any statistics that show to what extent healthy
banks commit the same negligent acts without serious consequences, I know
from experience that even healthy, well-run banks can be, and frequently are,
criticized by their examiners for actions, policies and procedures which, in
the context of a failed institution, would be deemed "management-driven
weaknesses." 155 It remains to be seen whether increased monitoring by
holding companies will result in fewer run-of-the-mill lapses of judgment
that necessarily plague all human activity .156 Even if stringent oversight
could reduce or eliminate bad decision-making, sometimes market forces
beyond anyone's control cause a bank to fail. 157
Accepting for the moment the broad proposition that monitoring
management may be a useful approach to reducing the risk of bank failure,
we still need to assess how useful it might be in practice. When we examine
the policy more closely, we may find that it overstates the role that directors
can realistically play in insuring the safety and soundness of the institutions
they run. 158 One must keep in mind that most bank directors are not them
selves banking professionals and therefore have limited expertise in second-

seasoning than they ideally should have had. Given these limitations, they were more
likely to see management mistakes where others would have found only bad luck.
15
'These management-driven weaknesses include everything from poorly followed
loan policies, excessive loan growth and overconcentration in a particular industry to
inadequate compliance systems, poor loan monitoring and accounting deficiencies. See
id.
156
Generally, bank directors will not be liable for simple lapses of judgment. See,
e.g., Muller v. Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 275 S.W. 750 (Ark. 1925) (holding that bank
directors must exercise good faith and diligence in managing a bank, but are not liable
for mere exercise of poor judgment); Warren v. Robison, 70 P. 989 (Utah 1902) (holding
that directors will not be responsible for depreciation in value of bank stock when such
depreciation results from errors of judgment).
157
The OCC study found that 35% of the banks that failed did so due to "external
economic conditions" such as inflation, recession, competition and interest rate volatility.
See CBO STUDY, supra note 15, at 20. But as the CBO warned, that 35% figure could
be misleading because "[i]t is not possible to separate 'external economic conditions'
neatly from problems of asset quality [which is considered a management driven
weakness]." /d.
8
IS See John D. Hawke, Jr., The Limited Role of Directors in Assuring the Soundness
of Banks, 6 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 285 (1987) (arguing that bank directors typically
neither have access to information nor the banking skills necessary for the effective
prevention of bank failure).
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guessing their senior management. 159 Even in well-run banks, it is difficult
for directors to have access to and to correctly interpret the kinds of informa
tion they need to properly run a bank; and even if they could, it is not
feasible or desirable for directors to become involved in operational matters,
such as determining the appropriate loan loss reserve or the writing down of
loans. 160 These facts, together with the point made above that to err is
human, create doubts about the ability of bank directors to change the way
'
banking business is conducted.
Generally, corporate directors are not required by the law to do more
than an ordinarily prudent person, acting in good faith, in a manner she
reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation, would do in
a like position under similar circumstances. 161 Clearly, bank directors are

159

0ne commentator has noted:

A director of a typical small bank is likely to be a local businessman or business
woman who is neither an expert in banking nor a professional manager. Very often the
director is an entrepreneur who has been successful in his or her own business. Most
small banks do not take on directors for their business management expertise. Rather
the principal criterion is the likelihood that the director will bring business to the bank.

Hawke, supra note 158, at 286-87. The typical large bank directors often "are
professional managers who are top executives for the bank's corporate customers and
thus are more sophisticated in complex business transactions than the typical small bank
director." I d. The sorry state of bank directors has prompted one commentator to call for
licensure of bank directors. See Martin Lowy, We Need Licensed Bank Directors, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 5, 1991, at 4.
1
roSee Hawke, supra note 158, at 288. The difficulties facing directors are even
greater for the "outside" directors, who not only must rely on second-hand information,
but also operate under severe time constraints due to pressure from their other non-bank
commitments. See Hugh Farrell Sharber, Comment, A Realistic Duty of Care for Outside
Bank Directors, 51 TENN. L. REV. 569, 573 (1984) (arguing that outside directors should
have a lower standard of care when they can show that they had no role or responsibility
for the area of the bank where the mismanagement occurred); see also Committee on
Corporate Laws, Guidelines for the Unaffiliated Director of the Controlled Corporation,
44 Bus. LAW. 211, 212-13 (1988) (pointing out that outside directors face "practical
difficulties" in fulfilling the review function, especially lack of access to relevant
information for decision-making purposes); Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment
Rule and the Director's Duty ofAttention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477 (1984)
(arguing that the business judgment of directors should be determined using a standard
that reflects the practical realities of the time constraints and other pressures on
directors).
161
This is the standard by the typical state corporate law. See MODEL Bus. CORP.
Acr § 8.30(a) (1994).
·
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not expected to be insurers of corporate success. 162 Except for an antiquat
ed and spotty line of cases that state otherwise, 163 bank directors are not
held to a higher standard than corporate directors generally .164
Although some commentators have wondered· whether FIRREA had
essentially established a nationwide standard of gross negligence, thereby
pre-empting states that had held directors liable for mere negligence, 165 the

162

See, e.g., Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1938) (finding directors
liable for losses caused by mismanagement when directors negligently failed to perform
their duties); Payne v. Ostrus, 50 F.2d 1039 (8th Cir. 1931) (holding bank directors
personally liable only for losses or damage sustained by the bank as a result of the
directors' violation of duty); McRoberts v. Spaulding, 32 F.2d 315 (S.D. Iowa 1929)
(finding that directors are not liable for unsuccessful loans provided the loans were made
in good faith and even if made as an error of judgment); FDIC v. Boone, 361 F. Supp.
133 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (holding that directors are liable only for losses caused by their
fault or neglect of duty).
163
See, e.g., Gadd v. Pearson, 351 F. Supp. 895, 903 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (holding
directors and officers liable for violating their fiduciary obligations by receiving stock
in the liquidation of a bank); First Nat'l Bank v. Doherty, 161 S.W. 211 (Ky. 1913)
(holding bank directors liable as trustees for the stockholders of the bank); Cosmopolitan
Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 136 N.E. 403,408 (Mass. 1922) (treating trustees of savings banks
as having the same fiduciary obligations as technical trustees of specific trust property);
Greenfield Sav. Bank v. Abercrombie, 97 N.E. 897, 899-900 (Mass. 1912) (interpreting
state law as creating a trust relationship between officers and depositors of savings
banks); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 668 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940) (holding that, in
light of the day's complex economic transactions, increasingly fewer distinctions between
"financial" and "industrial" corporations are viable). These cases have been roundly
criticized. The modem view is that a special duty of care for bank directors is
''unjustified and anachronistic." PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND REcOMMENDATIONS § 4.01, at 161 n.18 (Discussion Draft 1994).
164
An even trickier question concerns what standard of care to apply to director
action: should it be gross negligence or simple negligence? The question arises because
of an ambiguous sentence in FIRREA that amended section 1821(k) of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994). The language in FIRREA establishes
a cause of action against bank managers for gross negligence, but also includes a savings
clause which stated that "[n]othing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of
the [FDIC] under other applicable law." Id.
16
snlls issue generated a great deal of legal commentary. See, e.g., Douglas V. Austin
& Sidney M. Weinstein, Bank Officer and Director Liability Under FIRREA: The Need
fora National Standard of Gross Negligence, 111 BANKING L.J. 67 (1994) (recommend
ing adoption of a national negligence standard of liability to avoid the desertion of a
large number of competent directors who fear that they will be liable for simple
mistakes); Cindy A. Schipani, Should Bank Directors Fear FIRREA: The FDIC's
Enforcement of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, 17 J.
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issue seems to have been resolved by the Supreme Court decision in
O'Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC, 166 which held that federal courts must look
to state substantive law to fill in the blanks in federal statutes. 167 In light
of that decision, lower court interpretations of section 1821 (k) finding that
FIRREA establishes a nationwide cause of action for gross negligence,
overriding states where the standard was higher, while at the same time
preserving the right of the FDIC to proceed under a lower negligence
standard where permitted by state law, seem to state the correct view of the
law. 168 Regardless of whether the legal standard to hold directors liable for
their actions is simple negligence or gross negligence, there is a limit to what
we can expect directors to do.
Perhaps enhanced monitoring should focus not on the bank's directors
but on the officers instead. If the officers are committing fraud, or even just
covering their mistakes, however, it will be extremely difficult for any
monitor to detect, because the officers can conceal information from the
monitor with relative ease. 169 As banking policy moves toward establishing
directors and holding companies as watchdogs over bank officers, the

CORP. L. 739 (1992) (stating that directors on corporate boards who, although not usually
liable for negligent business decisions under federal law, are increasingly held liable for
grossly negligent business decisions; the majority of courts have ruled that the gross
negligence standard of section 1821(k) does not preempt state law causes of action for
simple negligence); Ronald W. Stevens & Bruce H. Nielson, The Standard of Care For
Directors and Officers of Federally Chartered Depository Institutions: It's Gross
Negligence Regardless of Whether Section 182J(k) Preempts Federal Common Law, 13
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 169 (1994) (arguing that courts should develop a federal
common law standard of care with reference to, and by incorporation of, state law).
166
114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994). For a useful summary of the O'Melveny case and the
controversy surrounding the appropriate standard of care for bank directors, see Afi
Ahmadi & Robert W. Guazzo, Developments in Banking Law 1995: Director and Officer
Liability/Fiduciary Liability, 15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 181, 181--88 (1996).
161
0'Melveny & Meyers, 114 S. Ct. at 2054.
168
See, e.g., RTC v. Williams, 887 F. Supp. 1415 (D. Kan. 1995) (applying Kansas
law in determining liability of directors because the institution had converted to a
national charter only seven years prior to insolvency and because state law provided
greater certainty and fewer practical difficulties than FIRREA standard); FDIC v. Raffa,
882 F. Supp. 1236 (D. Conn. 1995) (interpreting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) as not explicitly
preempting state law because language in statute is not restrictive and because the
savings, clause preserved the "other applicable law").
169
See Hawke, supra note 158, at 287.
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officers will face increasing temptation to conceal necessary information in
order to avoid criticism. 170
If the real goal of the market discipline regulatory strategy is to make
holding companies step up to the plate to help stop the moral hazard
problem, the way it has been implemented amounts to regulatory overkill.
Since the movement to increase bank capital in the late 1980s gained
momentum, bank holding companies have been attentive to bank risks
because the amount of capital they stand to lose is significant. Requiring
banks to put large amounts of capital at risk is the best way to make holding
companies pay attention to the riskiness of bank management. 171 To the
extent some degree of market discipline from the equity holders was
desirable to increase monitoring of bank management, the regulatory
structure did not need a complete overhaul. The only change necessary was
to make the capital requirements of banks significant enough to prevent the
temptation to over-leverage, and to provide a cushion for the risks of the
banking business. 172 Once the regulators increased the capital requirements
of banks, the self-interest of _holding companies coincidentally served to
further regulatory interests by tempering bank risk.
Beyond the risk-based capital standards, enhanced holding company
obligations add little to heightened shareholder oversight. The additional
obligations do not materially increase the level of scrutiny because the maxi
mum amount of shareholder effort is already applied in order to protect the
capital investment, and shareholder monitoring alone cannot have any further
impact on management behavior. That is, there is a real limit to how much
shareholder monitoring alone can do in changing management action,
especially since the regulatory changes described in the first section
effectively squelched the most pernicious moral hazard problem by
prohibiting the flow of brokered insured deposits into troubled institu
tions.173 The enhanced capital standards with which banks have been living
for the last few years provide equity holders with sufficient economic
incentive to monitor management as well as they can. It is unlikely that the

170

See id.
See supra note 88.
17
%ere appears to be a strong connection between capital levels and thrift failure.
See Lawrence R. Cordell et al., Corporate Ownership and the Thrift Crisis, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 719,724-27 (1993). ''The ability to take on riskier investments at higher leverage
ratios directly benefitted stock S&L owners, who could capitalize these benefits directly
through appreciation of their stock holdings." /d. at 726.
113
See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
171
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additional potential liabilities imposed on banks make the monitoring process
any more effective. In short, everything after the increased capital require
ments results in diminishing returns in terms of enhanced monitoring.
While the mismatch between the potential liability placed on bank
holding companies and the role the regulatory scheme expects them to play
could be written off as an unavoidable problem of trying to correctly
calibrate a regulatory response, the consequences of such excessive monitor
ing can be severe. Despite the fact that additional potential liabilities cannot
make equity holders any more effective as monitors, the presence of those
liabilities can have a real effect on bank managers who know of their
existence and may be overly deterred by them. Bank managers are already
too cautious 174 and any additional regulation designed to make holding
companies exert more oversight may make them even more so. 175 Manag
ers may react by exercising too much caution and investing bank funds in
U.S. government securities instead of extending credit to small businesses in
the community, for example. On the credit that they do extend, an over
sensitivity to risk may result in higher pricing, overly conservative asset
valuations, and higher loan loss reserves, which in tum could lead to a self
fulfilling prophecy of closer regulatory scrutiny, examiner-ordered write
downs, and ultimately, a diminution in stock value long before the underly
ing credits warrant such actions. 176
Additionally, the current extensive holding company obligations act as
disincentives for firms to invest in or acquire banks. 177 As the regulators
of the thrift industry discovered when they miscalculated the amount of
liability to exact from acquirors of failed thrifts, substantial holding company
obligations discourage investors. 178 Given the growing competition between
114

See Garten, Revisited, supra note 5, at 192.
msee Utset, supra note 5, at 222 ("Managers, realizing that their investment in
human capital will be lost completely if they lose their jobs, will pay close attention to
regulators' signals, in some cases becoming much more cautious than the regulators
intended.").
116
See Paul H. Irving & T. Hale Boggs, Financial Institution Directors: Mitigating
Risks of Liability in Shareholder Actions, 109 BANKING L.J. 336, 349 (1992).
171
See Jackson, supra note 30, at 605-06 (noting the argument and providing some
responses).
178
In discussing the changes in the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's ("FHLBB")
capital maintenance agreements from being open-ended ongoing commitments by
acquirors to being more limited, four attorneys with the FHLBB noted that the open
ended policy "probably was detrimental to attracting new capital and well-capitalized
acquirors into the thrift industry." Julie L. Williams eta!., FHLBB's New Approach to
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the banking industry and other suppliers of financial services, the increased
holding company burden could act as a serious obstacle to the banking
industry's ability to attract new capital.
While we have seen that the regulators are fighting a rear-guard action,
Congress is fighting the last war too. It focuses public policy on financial
problems that occurred years ago without paying sufficient attention to crises
looming in the foreseeable future. Much of the financial services regulation
in the United Sates is focused on banks. The legislators on Capitol Hill seem
to assume that every family in America has its life savings tied up in the
local bank. But the reality of how financial assets are held is quite different.
Banks have been playing an increasingly smaller role in the financial market
place. Over the past twenty years, banks' share of U.S. financial assets has
fallen to less than thirty percent from sixty-six percent. 179 Mutual fund
assets now total almost as much as the deposits in domestic U.S. banks, yet
there exists a major disparity in the number of regulatory personnel supervis
ing the two industries. 180 Mutual funds, finance companies, and securities
firms are free from the capital requirements, business restrictions, and
Community Reinvestment Act requirements that burden banks. Although the
additional regulation of banks may be justified on the ground that they enjoy
the benefit of deposit insurance, one must ask at what point the burden
outweighs the benefit.
By piling on disincentives to risk-taking, the regulators are essentially
fighting the last war instead of looking ahead to the challenges on the
horizon. Although poor credit decisions and the availability of "hot" money
certainly played an important role in the bank failures of the 1980s, there is
reason to believe that lack of caution in the lending area funded by volatile
deposits may no longer be the biggest problem facing the banking indus-

Regulatory Capital Maintenance Obligations of Acquirors of S&Ls, 52 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 233 (Jan. 30, 1989).
119
See WilliamS. Haraf, Emerging Issues in Financial Markets, REGULATION, Winter
1994, at 12.
180
0ne report states that there were 214 SEC staff members assigned to supervising
the mutual fund industry in 1992, while there were a total of 21,000 staff in the agencies
regulating banks, thrifts and credit unions. See id. at 13. These numbers seem to be
stacked in favor of pres~nting a dramatic disparity, but it seems as though a significant
disparity exists, even with more conservative numbers.
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try .181 Today, the biggest problem confronting the banking industry is
surviving the competitive pressures from other financial services provid
ers.182 The next big war will pit mutual funds, investment bankers, insur
ance companies, pension funds, credit unions and other financial services
providers against the banking industry in a battle for the funds of investors
and customers.
In light of this "next war" scenario, imposing disincentives on bank
holding companies is counterproductive, unless the public policy is designed
to handicap the banking industry in order to give its competitors an
advantage in the heated competition that is already underway. Systemically,
over-regulating the banking industry and bank holding companies has an
overall negative effect on the banking industry compared to its competi
tors.183 Some commentators have argued that the current U.S. bank capital
structure puts the costs of bank capital too high, 184 and this, added to the
implicit costs of the hidden holding company obligations, makes banks'
capital even more expensive. The increase in bank capital costs could have
the effect of retarding the growth of the banking industry, or even contribut
ing to its decline. In an era of multi-national banking, this could be a serious
handicap for U.S. banks.

181
See Garten, Revisited, supra note 5, at 189-90 (citing the asset composition of
banks in the 1990s as evidence that banks are focusing less on lending and more on
conservative investments).
182
See id. at 192.
183
Banks suffer from a structural handicap when competing against mutual funds on
yield alone, because the costs of doing business as a bank are higher than the costs of
doing business as a mutual fund, especially if one takes into account the cost of deposit
insurance premiums, reserve requirements and compliance with social policy legislation
such as the Community Reinvestment Act. See Randall Smith, Banks Could be Pinched
for Deposits to Lend After Consumer Exodus, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1993, at C1
(surveying banks' loss of market share of consumer deposits to the mutual fund industry
and noting that some banks have tried to ameliorate the loss by selling their own mutual
funds).
184
Cf Sanford Rose, Higher Capital May Impair Bank Safety, AM. BANKER, Aug. 7,
1990, at 1 (arguing that banks will try to satisfy capital requirements by eliminating high
grade credits from their portfolios, resulting in increases in risk profiles of assets and
increased likelihood of default and bank failures).
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V. CONCLUSION
In the quest to find non-governmental monitors of bank management,
Congress and the federal banking regulators have developed cost shifting
strategies designed to create fmancial incentives for bank shareholders, and
specifically bank holding companies, to pay more attention to the risks their
banks undertake. The policy changes have, however, gone too far. The
regulators resolved the biggest problem confronting the industry by
outlawing the practice of permitting brokered high-interest insured deposits
to fund risky activities in insolvent banks. By enacting higher capital
requirements, the regulatory scheme increased incentives for bank equity
holders to the optimal level. The employment of regulatory devices that
potentially impose liability on bank holding companies above and beyond the
loss of the capital invested in the bank do not increase the effectiveness of
shareholder monitoring but instead only create an unfair drag on the banking
industry relative to its non-banking competitors.

